VoidProxy: Sophisticated Phishing-as-a-Service Targeting Microsoft 365 and Google
Researchers at Okta Threat Intelligence have uncovered a phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platform named VoidProxy, designed to steal sensitive account information at scale.
🔍 How VoidProxy works
- Entry point: Emails sent from compromised accounts at providers like Constant Contact and Active Campaign, using shortened links and redirections.
- Hosting: Disposable low-cost domains (.icu, .sbs, .cfd, .xyz, .top, .home) shielded by Cloudflare.
- Legitimacy trick: Visitors see a Cloudflare CAPTCHA before being served phishing pages.
- Attack chain:
- Displays fake Microsoft 365 or Google login pages
- Captures credentials, MFA codes, and session cookies
- Federated SSO accounts (via Okta) redirected to second-stage phishing flows
- Attackers receive captured cookies in their VoidProxy admin panel
📌 Why it matters
This approach allows attackers to bypass MFA protections, providing them full account access.
✅ Who’s protected?
- Users with phishing-resistant authentication (e.g., Okta FastPass)
- Those enforcing risk-based access controls and IP session binding
🔐 Researcher recommendations:
- Restrict sensitive apps to managed devices only
- Enforce re-authentication for admin actions
- Apply risk-based access policies
⚠️ Conclusion
VoidProxy highlights the growing sophistication of phishing-as-a-service ecosystems, lowering the barrier for attackers while raising the stakes for enterprises.
At Alcaeus Services, we help organizations deploy strong authentication, risk-based access controls, and proactive phishing defenses to counter AitM and PhaaS threats.
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